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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
A review is made of the quantitative methods used in the NREFS project (Management of
Nuclear Risks: Environmental, Financial and Safety) set up to consider how best to respond
to  a big nuclear accident. Those methods were: the Judgement- or J-value, optimal economic
control and a combination of the computer codes PACE and COCO2 produced at Public Health
England. The NREFS results show that the life expectancy lost through radiation exposure
after a big nuclear accident can be kept small by the adoption of sensible countermeasures,
while the downside risk is less severe than is widely perceived even in their absence. Nearly
three quarters of the 116,000 members of the public relocated after the Chernobyl accident
would have lost less than 9 months’ life expectancy per person if they had remained in
place, and only 6% would have lost more than 3 years of life expectancy. Neither ﬁgure is
insigniﬁcant, but both are comparable with life expectancy differences resulting from the
different day-to-day risks associated with living in different parts of the UK. It is clear in
hindsight that too many people were relocated after both the Chernobyl and the Fukushima
Daiichi accidents. Remediation methods can often be cost-effective, but relocation of large
numbers following a big nuclear accident brings its own risks to health and well-being and
should be used sparingly, a message coming from all three of the quantitative methods.
There is a need to understand and hence demystify the effects of big nuclear accidents
so  that decision makers are not pressurised into instituting draconian measures after the
accident that may do more harm than good.©  2017 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of Institution of Chemical
Engineers. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.
org/licenses/by/4.0/).1.  Introduction
It is nearly 75 years since the world’s ﬁrst self-sustaining nuclear ﬁssion
process was demonstrated at Stagg Field, Chicago, and nuclear power
is now a signiﬁcant component of the world’s electricity supply. 435
nuclear power plants are operating worldwide, located in 30 countries,
while 72 new nuclear plants are under construction in 15 countries.
Nuclear power plants provided 12.3% of the world’s electricity produc-
tion in 2012, with 13 countries relying on nuclear energy to supply 25%
or more of their total electricity (Nuclear Institute, 2014). However the
severe reactor accident at Chernobyl in 1986 caused 335,000 members
of the public to be relocated permanently away from their homes while
voluntarily after the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power
plant. These are huge numbers without industrial precedent, and raise
the question of how far they were justiﬁed and, more generally, how
should one cope with a big nuclear accident, should it occur in the
future?
This question raised above formed the focus for the NREFS research
project (Management of Nuclear Risks: Environmental, Financial and
Safety). The project was sponsored by the Engineering and Physical Sci-
ences Research Council (EPSRC) as part of the UK-India Civil Nuclear
Power Collaboration, and involved 4 universities: City, University of
London, Manchester University, The Open University and the Univer-
sity of Warwick. The author, who was Principal Investigator, was based25 years later 160,000 people were instructed to relocate or moved away
E-mail addresses: pjt3.michaelmas@gmail.com, philip.thomas@bris
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.psep.2017.07.026
0957-5820/© 2017 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of 
under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).at City, University of London throughout the duration of the NREFStol.ac.uk
project before taking up his current position with the Safety Systems
Research Centre of the University of Bristol in 2015.
Institution of Chemical Engineers. This is an open access article
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Fig. 1 – Balancing the utility of earnings against life
expectancy.


































Fig. 2 – Showing radio-nuclide deposition, growth of
vegetation and harvesting, either directly or via animalhich ε is risk-aversion).
This paper reviews the methods used to generate answers to the
uestions raised above, and summarises the main ﬁndings ﬁrst pre-
ented in outline form to the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Nuclear
nergy on 11 March 2015 (NREFS, 2015). Three diverse methods point
owards the conclusion that while big nuclear accidents are undoubt-
dly bad things, the radiation harm to the public is signiﬁcantly less
evere than is widely perceived, even in the worst cases. The fact that
he downside risk is much less than is widely feared should reduce
he pressure on decision makers. They should thus ﬁnd themselves
n a better position to take rational decisions as a result, and resist the
emptation to institute draconian precautionary measures that may do
ore harm than good.
.  Methods  of  assessment
t is a requirement of Article 16.1 of the Convention on Nuclear
afety (International Atomic Energy Agency, 1994) that cop-
ng strategies for big nuclear accidents should be developed
n advance, a stance that is reinforced by experience at both
hernobyl and Fukushima Daiichi. But any mitigation strategy
dopted in practice will ﬁnd itself in the spotlight of national
nd world opinion, and needs to be capable of rigorous justi-
cation, not only to experts in the ﬁeld but also to politicians
nd the general public, who are widely presumed to have a
articular fear of nuclear radiation, especially in the context
f industrial nuclear power.
The use of subjective techniques to support mitigation
trategies is immediately problematical, since judgements
ade by one group will almost inevitably clash with judge-
ents made by another. This puts a premium on making the
ethods used for guidance and decision making in relation to
uch accidents as objective as possible, since these can offer
he potential for wide acceptance.
Three quantitative methods were used in the NREFS
roject:
 the J- or Judgement-value method (Thomas et al., 2006a,b,c),
which achieves objectivity and impartiality through bal-
ancing any future radiation-induced loss of life expectancy
against the amount it is rational to spend on averting or
reducing the exposure, as illustrated diagrammatically in
Fig. 1. Appendix A summarises the J-value method, which
was validated against pan-national data during the course
of the project. It uses actuarial and economic parameters, all
objectively measurable, to throw new light on the problems
of relocation, food bans and remediation.
 optimal control, which follows the approach developed by
Richard Bellman (Bellman, 1952, 1954, 1957). It was applied
in the NREFS project to a model of the dynamic processfeeding.
of ground contamination after a major nuclear accident,
with the model elements shown in diagrammatic form
in Fig. 2. The extended system includes dynamic equa-
tions to describe the three broad countermeasures, food
bans, remediation and population movement  (relocation
and repopulation), that constitute the control variables
assumed available to the authorities.
• the combination of the Level 3 program, Probabilistic Acci-
dent Consequence Evaluation (PACE) described in Charnock
et al. (2013) with version 2 of the Cost of Consequences com-
puter program, COCO2 (Higgins et al., 2008). Both computer
codes were developed at Public Health England (PHE).
Despite coming at the problem from diverse viewpoints,
the three methods produced results that show signiﬁcant
commonality. Taken together, they reinforce the message that
governments have tended to overreact if and when a bad
nuclear reactor accident occurs, with the attendant offsite
releases of radioactivity. Such an overreaction goes against
the ﬁrst and most fundamental of the three key principles of
radiological protection, namely the Principle of Justiﬁcation:
“Any decision that alters the radiation exposure situation
should do more  good than harm” ICRP (2007).
Clearly the analyses of the Chernobyl and Fukushima Dai-
ichi accidents have been made with the beneﬁt of hindsight
and there is no intention to blame the authorities for their
responses in those cases. Nevertheless there are lessons to be
learned from those accidents which should be applied in the
management of a future big nuclear accident, should it occur.
3.  Major  ﬁndings  of  the  NREFS  project
3.1.  Relocation
Relocation is taken to mean living away from a designated
exclusion zone for a substantial time (many months or a year
or more), after which return to the original location starts to
become problematical. Staying away for a prolonged period
will reduce both social and occupational ties to the original
location and has been found to engender a general reluctance
to return. It has a meaning distinct from ‘evacuation’, which is
carried out in hours or over a day or two and is not expected to
last for long, often for less than a week and not usually more
than a month or so.
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Fig. 3 – Proﬁle of doses in future years relative to Year 1
dose.
The major ﬁnding is that, while some temporary evacua-
tion might be reasonable during the time in which the size
of the radioactive release is being conﬁrmed, very often it
will be sensible not to adopt a policy of large-scale relocation,
even after a big nuclear accident with signiﬁcant radioactivity
release.
The results of the three, diverse quantitative methods used
in the NREFS study are given below under the appropriate
subheadings:
• J-value,
• optimal economic control and
• Public Health England’s PACE-COCO2 program suite.
3.1.1.  J-value
The J-value results suggest that even the ﬁrst relocation in
1986 of 116,000 people from the vicinity of Chernobyl was
an overreaction. The J = 1, maximum permissible loss of life
expectancy per person was calculated at 8.7 months for the
economic and actuarial conditions of the Soviet Union in 1986.
It was then possible to determine the corresponding radia-
tion dose proﬁle that would reduce by 8.7 months the life
expectancy of a person selected at random from amongst
those so exposed. Here the task was to ﬁnd the appropri-
ate scaling for the radiation decay curve shown in Fig. 3. On
this basis it is estimated that 31,000 relocated persons (26.5%)
needed to be relocated (Waddington et al., 2017a) since staying
in situ would expose them to a higher dose proﬁle and hence
a greater curtailment in life expectancy, based on population
dose data from UNSCEAR (2000) and UNSCEAR (2008). A loss of
life expectancy above 8.7 months would mean that the average
person would judge it worthwhile in terms of his or her over-
all life quality to pay the cost of relocation and avoid the dose
and associated reduction in life to come. In terms of Fig. 1, a
gain of more  than 8.7 months would tip the scales in favour of
relocation. (The person would not normally expect to bear the
relocation cost personally, but his/her willingness to do so is
regarded as an appropriate criterion in welfare economics for
judging compensatory expenditure.)
The number to be relocated rises to 72,500 if it is assumed
that the 31,000 cannot be easily identiﬁed, and precaution-
ary relocation of the whole village or town is instituted if the
worst-affected 5% of the inhabitants are calculated to lose 8.7
months or more.  The countermeasure will thus exceed what
is needed by 95% of the people living in the affected towns
and villages. But even if the higher ﬁgure is adopted, this still
implies that relocation was not a suitable policy choice for over
a third (43,000) of the number relocated in 1986.The number of people moved in Chernobyl’s second relo-
cation four years after the accident was roughly double the
size of the population relocated in 1986. But the J-value sug-
gests that none of the 220,000 people in the second relocation
of 1990 ought to have been moved from their homes. Life
quality for those concerned, as measured by the Life Quality
Index (Nathwani and Lind, 1997; Nathwani et al., 2009; Thomas
et al., 2006a,b, 2010a), was being reduced as a result. This con-
clusion conﬁrms the ﬁnding of a study requested from the
European Community by the USSR and carried out contempo-
raneously with the second relocation (Lochard and Schneider,
1992; Lochard et al., 1992). Unfortunately their ﬁndings were
not taken up by the Soviet authorities, arguably creating a
precedent for the policy of very large-scale relocation as a
matter of course after a major nuclear accident.
Taking the two Chernobyl relocation exercises together, in
1986 and 1990, Waddington et al. (2017a) conclude that while
relocation of the members of the public under the highest
threat after Chernobyl would have been advisable in 1986, the
total number of people eventually relocated should have been
only between 9% and 22% of the ﬁnal ﬁgure of 335,000. This
implies that at least a quarter of a million people were moved
away from the Chernobyl area without proper justiﬁcation.
160,000 people were relocated after the 2011 accident at
Fukushima Daiichi, but the J-value analysis suggests it is dif-
ﬁcult to justify the relocation of even those facing the most
elevated radiation dose (Waddington et al., 2017a). Thus, after
examining the two biggest nuclear reactor accidents that have
been observed, the conclusion coming from the J-value studies
is that relocation ought to be used sparingly if at all.
The J-value provides an objective criterion against which
the reasonable extent of health and safety expenditure can be
judged, something that is especially valuable when payment
is to be made by a third party, such as an industrial company
or government. The J-value might indeed be useful to a person
considering whether or not to relocate voluntarily, but clearly
no restriction should be placed on the freedom of individuals
to move under their own volition.
3.1.2.  Optimal  economic  control
Broad corroboration for the J-value conclusion on the desir-
ability of restraint in the deployment of relocation as a
policy option comes from a diverse study using optimal eco-
nomic control (Yumashev and Johnson, 2017; Yumashev et al.,
2017). Wide ranges of economic parameter values (including
allowance for the health effects of radiation) are used in that
work to explore which optimal strategies might be applicable
to nuclear reactors situated throughout the world. Common-
alities amongst these schemes are then brought out through
classifying the optimal approaches into “Broad Strategies”.
Examination of the Broad Strategies reveals that relocation
forms no part of the optimal strategy for any combination of
economic parameter values in the Base Case (or Case I, to use
an alternative terminology).
Two variants to the Base Case are considered: Case II, where
relocation is imposed immediately after the accident, thus
excluding that action from the optimisation process, and Case
III, where there is a reversal of the Base Case assumption that
lower economic productivity awaits those moving from the
original to the new area. Permanent relocation is ruled out in
the very large majority of the optimal strategies associated
with either Case II and Case III.


























































mThe optimal economic control study concludes that relo-
ation is likely to be a less than optimal response after very
any  major nuclear accidents.
.1.3.  PACE-COCO2  program  suite
he general trend towards evacuating relatively low num-
ers and relocating permanently a much smaller number is
iven broad conﬁrmation in a further diverse study using Pub-
ic Health England’s PACE-COCO2 program suite. A ﬁctional
uclear power station is taken to be located on England’s
outh Downs, about 2½ miles from Midhurst in Sussex, and
s assumed to experience a severe reactor accident leading
o a release of radionuclides comparable in size to that at
ukushima Daiichi (Ashley et al., 2017). Such a bad accident
s projected to happen no more  than once in ten million years
n a modern reactor.
Two intervention levels, “lower” and “upper”, were consid-
red in choosing the mitigation strategies to be applied to the
reas around the stricken South Downs reactor, with the upper
ntervention level requiring the dose to be averted to have
eached a higher point before intervention could be justiﬁed.
hile the adoption of the lower, more  interventionist level
eads to a 25% reduction in the number of non-fatal cancers
ttributable to radiation effects, there is a difference of only a
ew percentage points between the two intervention levels in
erms of the numbers calculated for fatal leukemias and solid
ancers.
The expected number of people needing immediate, tem-
orary evacuation after this accident at the ﬁctional South
owns reactor is 44,000 when the lower, more  intervention-
st level is applied, but this number falls to 1500 when the
pper intervention level is employed. Temporary relocation
lasting up to 90 days) could affect 12,000 people, but these
hould be able to return to their original dwellings at the end
f the three-month period. Only 620 people are expected to
eed permanent relocation. Such a level of permanent relo-
ation is based on the rather strict return criterion, applied
hree months into the accident, that the radiation dose to be
eceived over the following 12 months at the original location
hould be 10 mSv  or less.
To put 10 mSv  per year into context, this level of dose, year
n year, has been found in over 40,000 homes surveyed in the
K, and is expected to be present in a further 60,000 British
wellings as a result of the in-seepage from the ground of nat-
rally occurring radioactive radon gas (Parliamentary Ofﬁce
f Science and Technology, 2001). To quantify the associated
evel of harm, a dose of 10 mSv  per year for 50 years is calcu-
ated, on the basis of the linear, no-lower-threshold model, to
educe the life expectancy of a typical person in the affected
opulation in the UK by about four and a half months. In real-
ty, the radiation dose after a nuclear reactor accident would
e falling signiﬁcantly, both between 3 months and 15 months
nd thereafter, in the way shown in Fig. 3 (Waddington et al.,
017a). This graph is based on the radioactive decay of the
wo caesium isotopes that dominate the dose to humans in
he medium and longer term, namely 134Cs (half-life 2.01 y)
nd 137Cs (30.2 y).
.1.4.  General  comments
he results from the three methods described above take no
ccount of the further negative effects (dislocation and stress)
ikely to be caused by the relocation process, especially when
he number of people relocated is a hundred thousand or
ore. In fact, the process of relocation itself is known to havea directly negative impact on the health and life expectancy
of those concerned. Over 1000 evacuees died prematurely
as a result of the evacuation process at Fukushima Daiichi
(World Nuclear Association, 2015). In a detailed analysis of
the evacuation of three nursing homes following the acci-
dent at Fukushima Daiichi, Murakami et al. (2015) found that
a combined total of roughly 10,000 days or 27½ years of life
expectancy were lost by the nursing home residents as a result
of a hasty evacuation. Deleterious psychological and sociolog-
ical effects have also been observed after the mass relocations
following Chernobyl:
“Evacuation and relocation proved a deeply traumatic
experience to many  people because of the disruption to
social networks and having no possibility to return to their
homes. For many  there was a social stigma associated with
being an ‘exposed person’.” (World Health Organization,
2016)
These ﬁndings reinforce the message that relocation
should be used sparingly following a severe nuclear reactor
accident.
3.2.  Remedial  measures:  agricultural  and  urban
3.2.1.  J-value
The J-value was used to assess remediation measures taken
after Chernobyl, which took the form of both urban decon-
tamination and agricultural measures to reduce the ingestion
of radioactive contamination. The latter included removing
vegetation, ploughing, liming, fertilization and reseeding, as
well as the application of ferrocyn to cattle feed to reduce the
uptake of caesium and hence its transfer to humans via milk
and meat. Assessment using the J-value showed that many
urban decontamination measures were justiﬁable after the
accidents at both Chernobyl and Fukushima Daiichi. More-
over, the J-value was able to provide not only a ranking but an
objective quantiﬁcation of the degree of economic effective-
ness of each countermeasure. In general terms, remediation
emerged as a worthwhile option, although it would be nec-
essary to check the cost-effectiveness in each case using the
J-value (Waddington et al., 2017b).
3.2.2.  Optimal  economic  control
Under optimal economic control, local food production might
need to be brought to a halt in the immediate aftermath of a
big nuclear accident, but it would be returned to normal levels
typically within 2–2½ years.
3.2.3.  PACE-COCO2  program  suite
The PACE-COCO2 model of the South Downs reactor accident
calculates that the expected value of lost agricultural produc-
tion would be £130 M. The total cost of the accident could be
expected to be £800 M but there is a 1 in 20 chance that it
could reach £2.8 bn, not including the cost to the electric util-
ity company of decommissioning the stricken reactor, nor of
replacing its electricity generation capability.
3.3.  Control  of  sheep  meat  in  the  UK  following  the
Chernobyl  accident
It is clear with hindsight that the authorities overreacted with
their relocation policy at Chernobyl and that the same thing
happened at Fukushima Daiichi. But the governments of the
USSR and Japan were not alone in the exaggeration of their
8  Process Safety and Environmental Protection 1 1 2 ( 2 0 1 7 ) 4–15response. Based on J-value analysis, it is now clear that the
UK authorities adopted a strategy with regard to sheep meat
on the Cumbrian, Welsh and Scottish uplands after Chernobyl
that was, at least by the end, too precautionary.
Restrictions were imposed in 1986 on the movement, sale
and slaughter of sheep on 9700 farms in North Wales, Cum-
bria, Scotland and Northern Ireland. The number of restricted
farms was reduced over the years, so that by 2010 only 300
farms remained in this restricted category. But the restrictions
on Welsh and Cumbrian lamb imposed after Chernobyl were
not lifted for these farms until 2012, when their cost was at
least an order of magnitude too much as they increased life
expectancy of UK citizens by seconds only, a gain that must
lie below the de minimis level in any case (Waddington et al.,
2017c). Keeping them in place for 26 years constituted an over-
reaction to Chernobyl.
The NREFS project did not have the resource to investigate
how long the restrictions on sheep meat should have been
kept in place before being terminated, nor, indeed, whether
it was sensible to impose them in the ﬁrst place. But such a
J-value study could be expected to produce useful results to
guide future policy.
3.4.  Life  expectancy  as  a  measure  of  harm
As discussed in Waddington et al. (2017a), medical profes-
sionals are seeking a better way of understanding the risk
from nuclear radiation both for their own information and
so that they can communicate an accurate picture to the
people in their care who  look to them for impartial advice.
Calculated as a matter of course in the application of the J-
value method, the radiation-induced loss of life expectancy is
itself an information-rich statistic that is nevertheless easy to
understand. Moreover, loss of life expectancy is the best sin-
gle indicator of what is lost when someone dies prematurely
(Thomas and Vaughan, 2013). Thus, even in the absence of a
J-value, the loss of life expectancy may offer medical profes-
sionals and others a good comparative measure with which to
explain levels of risk to lay people and professionals alike.
Take, for example, the situation after the Chernobyl acci-
dent in 1986. The expected life to come for people of all ages
in the Ukraine was about 35 years in 1986, with the corre-
sponding life expectancy at birth being about 67 years. (For
comparison, the current ﬁgures for the UK are about 42 years
and 81 years respectively.) The application of the Change of
Life Expectancy After Radiation Exposure (CLEARE) program,
with actuarial data appropriate for the Soviet Union in 1986
(Waddington et al., 2017a), shows that that 73.5% (85,500) of
the 116,000 people relocated from around Chernobyl in 1986
would have lost less than 8.7 months of life expectancy per
person if they had remained in situ, with an average loss of
about 3 months. 8.7 months is, of course, the J = 1 loss of life
expectancy, above which the J-value method would recom-
mend relocation. About 6800 people, 6% of those relocated in
1986, would have lost 3 years or more  if they had not been
relocated. The average dose received by these worst-affected
6800 people would have cost them 5.6 years of life expectancy
per person in the absence of relocation.
None of these ﬁgures, 3 months, 8.7 months, 3 years and 5.6
years, is insigniﬁcant, and the J-value prescribed relocation in
the former Soviet Union when the loss of life expectancy per
person exceeded 8.7 months. But even the highest two ﬁgures
may be put into a degree of context as a result of their simi-
larity to the differences in life expectancy resulting from thedifferent day-to-day risks associated with living in different
parts of the UK. Thus the average person living in Harrow in
London can expect to live about 3¼ years longer than the aver-
age person domiciled in Manchester (based on the 6½ years
difference in life expectancy at birth across the two  genders
(ONS, 2015) and the life expectancy ratio (population average
life expectancy ÷ life expectancy at birth) of roughly 0.5 for the
UK (Thomas and Waddington, 2017a,b)).
Even the highest of the ﬁgures cited, a loss of life
expectancy of 5.6 years in the absence of relocation, is less
than the difference, 8.6 years, in life expectancy of baby boys
born in Kensington and Chelsea and of those born in Black-
pool (ONS, 2015). These comparisons do not make the case for
inaction, since, by the J-value, relocation should have been
instituted for any loss of life expectancy greater than 8.7
months per person after the Chernobyl accident. But it is sug-
gested that they do promote a quantitative understanding of
the size of the radiation risks to the public living nearby after
the worst nuclear reactor accident the world has experienced.
A second evacuation was effected at Chernobyl four years
after the event in 1990, in which 220,000 people were relocated
permanently. The average dose for the 900 people living in the
most contaminated areas and relocated in 1990 (less than 0.5%
of the 220,000 moved out then) would have led to a loss of life
expectancy of 3 months if they had remained in place. This is
two thirds of the roughly 4½ months life expectancy that the
average Londoner is currently losing because of air pollution
(based on the 9 months loss of life expectancy at birth cited in
Darzi (2014) and the life expectancy ratio of 0.5 mentioned in
the paragraph above).
3.5.  The  loss  of  life  expectancy  due  to  a  radiation
induced  cancer
The losses of life expectancy discussed in Section 3.4 will apply
to a population or sub-population, most of whom will not con-
tract a radiation induced cancer and will thus lose no years of
life at all. So the question is raised of how great is the loss of
life expectancy amongst those destined to be radiation cancer
victims, even if fortunately there are likely to be few of them.
The situation of radiation exposure was represented using
a simple but physically meaningful model, in which those
exposed were subject either to a constant radiation dose rate
over time or to a “point” exposure, proﬁles that bracket the
falling dose proﬁle shown in Fig. 3 that is characteristic of
public exposure after a big nuclear reactor accident (Thomas,
2017). It is found that the average radiation cancer victim will
live into his or her 60s or 70s, depending on how long the radi-
ation exposure lasts, based on data from the UK life tables.
Between 8 and 22 years of life expectancy will be lost on aver-
age by a radiation cancer victim. The calculational method
adopts the linear, no-threshold model recommended by the
International Committee on Radiation Protection (ICRP), but
the result is independent of both the size of the risk coefﬁcient
and the size of the annual dose, provided the dose is below
the level where it causes acute radiation syndrome (radiation
sickness and, in extreme cases, death).
The fact that the highest average loss of life expectancy due
to a radiation induced cancer is 22 years is striking, since this is
only about half the loss of 42 years that an immediately lethal
accident, such as a car crash, would bring about. Thus averting
a radiation induced cancer brings only about half the beneﬁt
accruing from averting an immediately fatal railway or auto-
mobile accident. Such a comparison is fully relevant under

















































Fig. 4 – The Preston curve — life-expectancy at birth (years)
as a function of GDP per capita (international dollars) for thehe view, held very widely in society and, indeed, enshrined
n law, that life is preferred to death. It should be borne in
ind, too, that the long latency period of radiation-induced
ancers means that most of the two decades of extra life that
he average radiation cancer victim gains over the fatal car
rash or rail crash victim can be expected to be lived normally,
ith living becoming restricted, with an attendant eventual
eed for palliative care, only near the end of the period.
This would suggest that people ought to be prepared to
ay out about twice as much on systems to avert immedi-
te deaths on the railways or in cars as they would to avert
elayed, radiation-induced cancer deaths. Interestingly, this
uns directly counter to the current stance of the Health
nd Safety Executive (HSE), as enunciated in their document,
Reducing Risks, Protecting People: HSE’s decision-making
rocess”:
“Currently, HSE takes the view that it is only in the case
where death is caused by cancer that people are prepared
to pay a premium for the beneﬁt of preventing a fatality
and has accordingly adopted a VPF twice that of the roads
benchmark ﬁgure. Research is planned to assess the valid-
ity of this approach.A¨ppendix 3, paragraph 13 (HSE, 2001).
Objectively, the HSE would seem to have got it the wrong
ay round. The result calls into question the concept of the
alue of a Prevented Fatality (VPF) that is still recommended
y the UK Government on a “one-size ﬁts all” basis. Further
rofound problems exist with the ﬁgure used for UK VPF, as
iscussed in Appendix B.
.6.  Validating  the  J-value  method
he paper by Thomas and Waddington (2017a) tests the valid-
ty of the J-value method against international observations
f life expectancy and GDP per head, and ﬁnds that the J-
alue passes the test and is able to explain the ﬁndings. The
-value-based model made the following assumptions:
(i) the annual budget available to prolong citizens’ life
xpectancy is a ﬁxed fraction of gross domestic product (GDP)
er head,
(ii) the budget is spent in full each year under the constraint
hat the J-value associated with life-extending decisions is
nity,
(iii) the value of risk-aversion applicable to decisions on
ife extension remains constant as wealth and life expectancy
ncrease in tandem and is thus the same for all nations in
he world. (Risk-aversion, while corresponding closely to the
oncept as used in ordinary language, beneﬁts from a rigorous
athematical deﬁnition; see Thomas (2016))
(iv) the net discount rate applied to life expectancy remains
onstant as wealth and life expectancy increase in tandem.
The resulting J-value-based model is able to explain the
ariation in population-average life expectancy with GDP per
ead, as plotted on logarithmic axes. Named the “Bristol
urve” after the city where the two authors were working
Thomas and Waddington, 2017a,b), this locus complements
he Preston curve with which Preston (1975) highlighted the
ositive correlation between national GDP per head and life
xpectancy at birth (Fig. 4). With an R2 value of 0.80 when
pplied to 162 out of the 193 nations recognised by the UN,
he J-value model is able to explain 80% of the variation in
he logarithm of population-average life expectancy in terms
f the variation in the logarithm of GDP per head. An exten-
ion of the J-value model is able to give what is believed to180 countries for which both datasets are available for 2009.
be the ﬁrst theoretical explanation for the Preston curve. It is
predicted correctly that moving from the Bristol to the Pre-
ston curve will cause the characteristic risk-aversion to fall by
about 5% on average. The log–log version of the Preston curve
is then explicable with an almost identical R2 value, 78%, for
the 162 countries.
The Bristol curve results are corroborated by an indepen-
dent method whereby the previous derivation of the value of
risk-aversion (Thomas et al., 2010a) is extended to include an
allowance for the employee enjoying his/her time at work half
as much as his/her leisure time (as opposed to not enjoying
working time at all). As a result, decisions concerning exten-
sion of life made by a person in a developed country emerge as
being subject to a risk-aversion, 0.91, that is about 10% above
the value of 0.82 derived from examining the trade-off that
people in the UK make between free time and working time
(Thomas et al., 2010a).
The J-value-based model just described has been further
tested in a different role, namely the prediction of future life
expectancy at birth within a given country. Its success in this
task with a risk-aversion of 0.91 for the UK and other econom-
ically advanced countries provides additional validation for
the J-value concept (Thomas, 2017a). The J-value’s success in
these validation exercises stands in stark contrast to the deﬁ-
ciencies uncovered in the method currently used in the UK to
value human life, as explained in Appendix B.
The J-value approach emerges as essentially a formalisa-
tion of an approach being used intuitively all over the world
to assess most health and safety spending decisions. Its value
lies in making judgements objective and consistent as well as
transparent, thus providing a level playing ﬁeld for improving
safety across all human activities, from nuclear through oil
and gas, chemicals and transport through to the provision of
health services (Thomas, 2017b).
4.  Discussion
Few would dispute that anxiety about radioactive fallout after
a major nuclear reactor accident is one of the great fears of
the age (see, for example, Nuttall and Ashley, 2017). Certainly
when prompted, people will express a high level of concern
or dread of nuclear radiation, especially if it is associated
with industrial nuclear power (e.g. Ropeik, 2013). The NREFS
project has surveyed the evidence available from the world’s
two biggest nuclear reactor accidents and examined how far
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investigation, with the new J-value technique deserving a spe-
cial mention, as it was validated against empirical data during
the course of the NREFS study, conferring high credibility on
J-value assessments as a result.
NREFS made a detailed analysis of the aftermath of the
Chernobyl accident in 1986, where the core went super-
prompt critical during, ironically, a safety experiment. The top
was blown off the reactor, the core melted through the bottom
of the reactor pressure vessel and a ﬁre raged out of control for
10 days, during which time large amounts of radioactive mate-
rial escaped unhindered into the atmosphere. It is difﬁcult to
see how the situation on the nuclear reactor could have been
much worse, and there is no disagreement that Chernobyl rep-
resents the worst nuclear reactor accident the world has seen
to date.
30 plant personnel and ﬁreﬁghters died in the immediate
aftermath of the Chernobyl accident and the 116,000 mem-
bers of the public considered to be most at risk were relocated
permanently in 1986. However the J-value analysis suggests
that only between 31,000 and 72,500 people should have been
relocated after the Chernobyl accident, depending on the
speciﬁcity of the measurements and the accompanying esti-
mates of radiation dose. A second relocation of double the size
was carried out 4 years after the accident, but the J-value anal-
ysis suggests that it was not justiﬁable to uproot any of the
220,000 moved from their homes in 1990, a conclusion shared
with an authoritative study carried out contemporaneously for
the European Community at the request of the USSR (Lochard
and Schneider, 1992; Lochard et al., 1992).
Even if the short-term evacuation advised by the Japanese
authorities may have been justiﬁed while the situation clar-
iﬁed, the J-value results suggest that, given the Japanese
Government’s 20 mSv  y−1 safe-return criterion, it was not
advisable to relocate any of the 160,00 people actually relo-
cated after the accident at Fukushima Daiichi in March 2011,
even those facing the highest increase in exposure above nat-
ural background levels. Taken together, the Chernobyl and the
Fukushima analyses suggest that relocation of people should
be regarded as a countermeasure to be used sparingly if at all
after a major nuclear accident (although obviously no restric-
tion should be replaced on voluntary relocation).
It should be noted that the detailed conclusions drawn
concerning the post-accident management at Chernobyl and
at Fukushima beneﬁt from hindsight and, more speciﬁcally,
from data that would have been more  extensive than those
available in the immediate aftermath. Moreover, the numer-
ical results cited for the J-value depend on measurements
of ground contamination over large regions near the Cher-
nobyl and Fukushima Daiichi reactors and on models of the
behaviour of radiation-emitting radionuclides making up that
contamination, including radioactive decay and migration
into the human food chain. While there will, inevitably, be
scope for inaccuracy in both the model and the measure-
ments, nevertheless conﬁdence in the results is generated
by the commonality in the overall conclusions coming from
the other two, diverse approaches, namely optimal economic
control and PACE-COCO2.
The same general trend against mass relocation following a
major nuclear accident emerged from the PACE/COCO2 study,
where a core-damage accident at a ﬁctional reactor located
in Sussex was examined. Only about 600 people were marked
out for permanent relocation even when a strict return con-
dition was used, a ﬁgure in marked contrast to the more  than100,000 people displaced after both Chernobyl and Fukushima
accidents. Meanwhile relocation of a large population played
no part in the dominating fraction of economically optimal
strategies for medium-term recovery after a major nuclear
reactor accident (Yumashev et al., 2017).
In retrospect, it is clear that decision makers faced with the
immediate and longer-term aftermath of the world’s two  most
severe nuclear reactor accidents did not always make the best
decisions in their attempts to protect the lives and well-being
of the people under threat.
It is desirable that the performance of future decision mak-
ers facing a similar situation should be enhanced by providing
better information and decision support mechanisms. As a
minimum, further development is indicated both for the spa-
tially distributed measurement systems needed to produce
real-time readings of the quantities of radionuclides deposited
in the areas around a stricken nuclear power plant and for
the models needed to translate those measurements into cur-
rent and future doses for the people living in the surrounding
towns and villages. The doses may be either direct or come via
agricultural produce, but will diminish over time as the level
of radionuclides declines as a result of radioactive decay and
natural environmental processes. These long term transients
need to be modelled accurately at the various locations. The
information on dose proﬁles at multiple locations can then be
fed into the decision-support programs (J-value, optimal eco-
nomic control) that should be developed to make their results
available in real time to the decision maker. Clearly similar
support mechanisms ought to be provided at all the world’s
reactors.
The importance of communicating the risk from nuclear
radiation in a realistic but easily understood manner has
been ﬂagged by Japanese medical professionals, to whom the
public has looked for impartial advice after the Fukushima
Daiichi accident. While the J-value allows an objective balance
to be struck between reducing radiation-induced loss of life
expectancy and expending resource on a given countermea-
sure, the information-rich statistic of radiation-induced loss
of life expectancy, which is a component of J-value analysis,
could fulﬁl an important role in communicating how big or
small the radiation risk is. It encapsulates the best, unbiased
quantiﬁcation of what someone loses by dying prematurely
and provides a continuous scale for judging the severity of the
risk from radiation. Importantly, once calculated the change
in life expectancy is simple to understand. The basic meaning
will be taken on board easily by most people, who  gain famil-
iarity from their earliest years with the concept of personal
age through marking and often celebrating their birthdays.
The clear worth of loss of life expectancy as an aid to under-
standing just how big or small is the threat to the general
public after a big nuclear accident is brought out by applying it
to the populations of Ukraine and Belarus following the Cher-
nobyl accident. Although the harm to some people living near
Chernobyl would have been signiﬁcant if they had stayed in
place, a comparison with the differences in life expectancy in
different parts of the UK shows that the level of harm following
a severe reactor accident, even in the absence of relocation, is
almost certainly not as signiﬁcant as many  people believe.
There is no doubting that a severe nuclear accident is a
very bad thing and strong efforts should continue to be made
to ensure that it happens very infrequently. However, the mes-
sage emerging from the ﬁgures on loss of life expectancy and
the desirable extent of relocation is that the downside risk
from even the worst nuclear accident can be calculated and is























rikely to be limited. Knowledge of this fact will hopefully put
ecision makers in a better position to take sensible decisions
nd prevent them being pressurised by exaggerated fears into
ushing out draconian precautionary measures that may well
ause more  harm than good.
The evidence emerging from NREFS is, unfortunately, that
he draconian actions taken by the respective governments
fter Chernobyl and Fukushima may well have done more
arm than good. Others have concluded similarly. For exam-
le, the World Health Organisation (WHO), in conjunction
ith the International Atomic Energy Agency and the United
ations Development Programme, said in 2005 that, after
hernobyl:
“mental health problems pose a far greater threat to local
communities than does radiation exposure.
“Relocation proved a ‘deeply traumatic experience’ for
some 350,000 people moved out of the affected areas.
Although 116 000 were moved from the most heavily
impacted area immediately after the accident, later relo-
cations did little to reduce radiation exposure.
“Persistent myths and misperceptions about the threat of
radiation have resulted in ‘paralyzing fatalism’ among res-
idents of affected areas." (WHO,  2005a)
The three organisations just mentioned enlarged upon
heir comments on the response to Chernobyl in the section
ntitled, “Answers to Longstanding Questions” (WHO,  2005b):
“More than 350 000 people have been relocated away from
the most severely contaminated areas, 116 000 of them
immediately after the accident. Even when people were
compensated for losses, given free houses and a choice
of resettlement location, the experience was traumatic
and left many  with no employment and a belief that they
have no place in society. Surveys show that those who
remained or returned to their homes coped better with
the aftermath than those who were resettled. Tensions
between new and old residents of resettlement villages
also contributed to the ostracism felt by the newcomers.
The demographic structure of the affected areas became
skewed since many  skilled, educated and entrepreneurial
workers, often younger, left the areas leaving behind an
older population with few of the skills needed for economic
recovery."
and
“According to the [Chernobyl] Forum’s report on health,
‘the mental health impact of Chernobyl is the largest public
health problem unleashed by the accident to date.’ People
in the affected areas report negative assessments of their
health and well-being, coupled with an exaggerated sense
of the danger to their health from radiation exposure and
a belief in a shorter life expectancy."
The fact that this message was promulgated widely by a
espected body over ten years ago raises the question as to why
opeik (2013) as well as Nuttall and Ashley (2017) (and many
ore)  should believe that people still look with dread upon
he health effects of radiation after a major nuclear accident.
here seem to be two reasons for such dread. The ﬁrst relates
o the last point in the quotation immediately above, namely
he shorter life expectancy that people fear that they will be
eft with if their area is contaminated by nuclear fallout after a
eactor accident. The truth is that, up until now, few radiationexperts have attempted to address this fear head on. This can
be done only by stating how much life expectancy the affected
people are likely to lose. Fortunately, as a result of the NREFS
work, it is now possible to calculate directly how much life
expectancy will be lost, both for those relocated and for the
same people if they had stayed in situ.
The doses experienced by the 116,000 people moved out in
the ﬁrst relocation after Chernobyl can be calculated to have
led to an average loss of less than 2 weeks’ life expectancy,
caused by the residual higher dose that they faced. This is self-
evidently a rather small loss. Equally striking is how much they
would have lost if they had stayed in situ, with no evacuation
and no relocation. As noted in Section 3.4, the average loss of
life expectancy for nearly three-quarters of the 116,000 people
relocated would have been about 3 months if they had stayed
in place, with the average loss of life expectancy exceeding 3
years for only about 7000 of the 116,000 people, based on dose
estimates used in Waddington et al. (2017a). While it has been
shown desirable to evacuate people set to lose 9 months of
life expectancy or more,  it needs to be borne in mind that the
penalties arrising from leaving people in place are still com-
parable with differences in life expectancy incurred from the
day-to-day risks of normal living in different parts of a highly
developed country like the UK.
The people affected by the nuclear accident will not know
in advance whether or not they will be personally affected
by the increased risk of a radiation-induced cancer, and this
makes the average loss of life expectancy across non-victims
and victims discussed above the appropriate measure to use in
the ﬁrst instance. But those same people will almost certainly
want to have some idea of the likely downside if they should
turn out to be a radiation cancer victim, that is to say one of
the small number of people who will, unfortunately, die pre-
maturely as a result of contracting a radiation induced cancer.
It turns out that even here there are grounds for encourage-
ment, in the sense that the average radiation cancer victim
will live past the age of 60, based on UK life table data and
the Marshall model of radiation cancer mortality period, the
period between induction and death. Moreover, the average
loss of life expectancy is, at between 8 and 22 years, about
half at most of the loss of life expectancy associated with an
immediately lethal accident, such as a fatal road or rail crash.
The variances associated with the ﬁgures just quoted are
high, and the situation is generally worse for a young per-
son compared with an older person. But even for someone
who is both very young at the time of the accident and also
one of those unfortunately destined to contract a radiation-
induced cancer, the loss of life expectancy is highly likely to
be at least 15 years less than that following involvement in a
fatal road accident as a very young person. (See Thomas, 2017,
Fig. 15, “Age at death for radiation cancer victims with a start-
ing age of zero”.) For prolonged radiation exposures the mean
age at death climbs to over 60 years, even for those facing an
increased radiation level from birth.
But now we come to the second reason why people are
likely to fear radiation exposure after a big nuclear accident:
neither they nor their governments have been able to put the
risk properly into context. While the loss of life expectancy is
an important and information-rich statistic, it does not do the
whole job. It turns out that, in judging any probabilistic risk,
such as the chance of harm from radiation, it is necessary to
consider not only the expected harm but also the expected
cost of averting that harm. This has now become possible and
may be effected using the validated J-value method, which
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measurement and modelling systems, for application at all
1 It is not being suggested that people are actually performing
J-value calculations in their heads, only that the J-value provides a
good model for the amount that people are prepared to spend on
life extending measures. Regarding such socio-economic models,
the  U.S. political scientist, Bueno de Mesquita (2009) summed up
the  situation clearly when he said: R¨eal people may not be able to
do  the cumbersome math that goes into a model, but that doesn’t
mean they aren’t making much more complicated calculations inallows the balance point to be found at which life quality, as
given by the life quality index, is just maintained. Spending up
to that point is then justiﬁed, but it is not desirable to spend
more.
In the past, and speciﬁcally after both the Chernobyl and
Fukushima Daiichi accidents, it is clear with hindsight that the
national governments became too risk-averse to that particular
risk and embarked upon exaggerated actions and spending. As
noted in WHO  (2005b):
“The costs have created a huge drain on the budgets of the
three countries involved [Ukraine, Belarus and Russia]."
which will have inhibited desirable public spending elsewhere.
It has been further demonstrated theoretically (Thomas et al.,
2010b,c; Thomas and Jones, 2010) that it is not a sensible thing
for a decision maker to increase his risk-aversion beyond a
deﬁnable point, the “point of indiscriminate decision”, after
which decisions take on an arbitrary character. What appears
to have been lacking generally is not the willingness by gov-
ernments to become ever more  risk averse when faced with
a nuclear hazard and to sanction very large expenditures in
consequence, but the realisation that it is not a good use of
public money to spend excessively to reduce the particular
risk from radiation. As has now been shown, even after the
world’s worst nuclear accident, the level of risk experienced
by the public in the absence of countermeasures is not out of
line with the differences in the risks of everyday living seen in
an advanced country.
Comfort might be sought in the thought that the gov-
ernments concerned with Chernobyl and Fukushima Daiichi
will, by overspending on support for those most affected, at
least have provided very substantial help to the people whose
health they were attempting to improve. But the evidence for
this proposition is not convincing. The World Health Organisa-
tion (WHO,  2005a,b) has pointed to relocation being traumatic
and leading to unemployment and a feeling of worthless-
ness amongst those relocated. Moreover, as noted above, WHO
(2005b) comments that the people affected have “an exag-
gerated sense of the danger to their health from radiation
exposure and a belief in a shorter life expectancy”.
The last point provokes the question of exactly why those
relocated should believe that the small radiation dose that
they will have received just before moving (and perhaps, at
a lower level, after they have done so) should have shortened
their lives by any signiﬁcant amount. Some illumination can
be provided here by the J-value. Most people can be expected
to have little feel for radiation and still less with the effect
on life expectancy that any given radiation dose is likely to
cause. On the other hand, he or she can be expected to have
a good feel for the enormous expenditure involved in relocat-
ing a hundred thousand people or more  and in abandoning
huge swathes of farmland. Moreover, as has been shown by the
validation studies (Thomas, 2017a; Thomas and Waddington,
2017a,b), people generally have a feel for the balance between
the desirability of life extending measures in general and the
money that should sensibly be paid on such measures. In
terms of the J-value model, one side of the equation is known
and well understood, and this known can now be employed to
work out the remaining unknown, namely the degree of harm
caused by the radiation received. To be sure, the normal use
of the J-value is to assess measures taken to reduce or avert
exposure to harm, but it could equally be used to assess how
much ought to be spent in compensation. Suppose that the
relocated people saw what was being spent on them not as away of protecting them from harm but as a way of compensat-
ing them for the damage that has been or is being inﬂicted on
them. Will they not now effectively back-calculate1 the extent
of their harm from the vast expenditure that they observe and
should they not therefore conclude, in all rationality, that the
likely harm they are facing is enormous, and that they are
almost sure to die much earlier than they would have done if
the accident had not happened? Is it not now fully rational for
those who have been relocated to see themselves as victims,
almost certain to die young? The Chernobyl Forum has testi-
ﬁed that many  of those relocated after Chernobyl have come to
this logical conclusion, from which further deleterious effects
have ﬂowed:
“The designation of the affected population as ‘victims’
rather than ‘survivors’ has led them to perceive themselves
as helpless, weak and lacking control over their future.
This, in turn, has led either to over cautious behavior and
exaggerated health concerns, or to reckless conduct, such
as consumption of mushrooms, berries and game from
areas still designated as highly contaminated, overuse of
alcohol and tobacco, and unprotected promiscuous sexual
activity." (WHO,  2005b)
So the overspending after a big nuclear accident in the
name of protection is immediately and inevitably compro-
mised by the indirect but very real harm that the very act of
overspending causes.
It is clear that decision makers facing a big nuclear accident
ought to be engaging what Kahneman (2011) has described as
“system 2” or analytical thinking in performing their duties,
rather than the knee-jerk “system 1”. But this is presumably
the general situation in which many  decision makers with
heavy responsibilities ﬁnd themselves. The hope must be that
dissemination of the NREFS results may start a gradual process
by which the need for such “system 2” thinking with regard
to big nuclear accidents becomes more  broadly accepted as a
replacement for the “system 1” approach that has been evi-
dent so far.
5.  Conclusions
The NREFS project has applied diverse, quantitative methods
to the problem of coping with the aftermath of a big nuclear
accident. The three different methods display a signiﬁcant
degree of commonality in their results and highlight the need
for restraint on the part of decision makers contemplating
relocation.
The performance of decision makers facing a large-scale
nuclear reactor accident can be improved by the provision
of better decision support mechanisms such as J-value and
optimal economic control. It is advisable to develop real-time
versions of these, together with the necessary radionuclidetheir  heads even if they don’t know how to represent their analytic
thought processes mathematically."





















































eeactors around the world in preparation for big nuclear acci-
ents that may never happen in the future but have happened
wice in the past 30 years.
However, a big lesson from NREFS is that there are limits to
he radiation damage likely to befall members of the public,
fter even the biggest nuclear reactor accidents. Most of the
arm from the world’s worst two nuclear reactor accidents is
ikely to have come from what can now be seen to be largely
njustiﬁed fear and worry and from the social disruption and
islocation caused by the relocation of hundreds of thousands
f people.
Excessive spending on the supposed protection of the
embers of public most affected after a big nuclear accident
ay well do more  harm than good. Not only might it con-
titute a waste of valuable resources, but it might well harm
he very people it is intended to help. Convinced by the scale
f the expenditure that they must be the victims of a terri-
le scourge, their mental and physical well-being may suffer
evere and self-fulﬁlling damage.
It is therefore very important that the relatively limited
ffects of even big nuclear accidents should be understood bet-
er and thus demystiﬁed. The dissemination of the results of
he NREFS project, both to decision makers and to the general
ublic, could begin that process.
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ppendix  A.  Summary  of  the  J-value  method
he J-value provides an objective assessment tool which can
e applied across all industries. It is a new technique based
n the life quality index (Nathwani and Lind, 1997; Nathwani
t al., 2009), but it makes use of established economic theory.The method has the considerable advantage when compared
with other approaches such as conventional cost beneﬁt anal-
ysis, that no explicit assumptions have to be made about the
difﬁcult issue of the monetary value to be attached to saving a
human life. Also, unlike other approaches, the J-value allows
immediate fatalities and potential loss of life in the longer
term (e.g. when the hazard includes exposure to a carcino-
gen), to be measured on the same scale. Ways to reduce risks
can then have their cost effectiveness assessed fairly.
The J-value balances safety spend against the extension of
life expectancy it brings about. At the core of J-value is the
concept of the life-quality index, placing a monetary value on
all future years of life based on GDP per head, using an empiri-
cally measured value of risk-aversion that allows the utility of
average income in the nation to be determined. The J-value is
found by dividing the actual cost of the safety measure by the
maximum that it is reasonable to spend. A value of less than
one indicates that the expenditure is fair. A value greater than
one suggests that spending resources may not be justiﬁed.
The objective decision is then simple. If the J-value is much
more  than one, the starting point for any decision is that the
resources should not be committed to reducing this risk. If it
is less than one, there is a strong case for spending the money.
Appendix  B.  Problems  with  the  Value  of  a
Prevented  Fatality  (VPF)  used  in  the  UK
When considering how best to respond to a big nuclear acci-
dent, a comparison between the cost of a safety measure
and the beneﬁt that it produces becomes a necessary part
of the analysis. The J-value is a fully objective way of carry-
ing out this comparison (e.g. Waddington et al., 2017a,b,c).
However, the conventional way of valuing human life in the
UK is through using the “value of a prevented fatality” (VPF),
which is the maximum notionally reasonable to pay for a
safety measure that will reduce by one the expected number
of preventable premature deaths in a large population. Given
its wide endorsement in the UK, an examination was  made of
the validity of the UK VPF.
There is an immediate problem with the VPF, since it is
assumed to be the same for all people in the UK, irrespective
of age; this in itself must be regarded as a highly questionable
assumption: does a 20 year old lose the same thing as a 90 year
old if he or she is killed in an accident? Furthermore the VPF
does not recognise a distinction between a threat of imminent
demise and threats where death, if it occurs, will be delayed
for decades, two very different things. Nevertheless the VPF
ﬁgure, updated to account for changes in gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) per head, has been used extensively in the UK for the
past 17 years as a reference not only by Government depart-
ments but also by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) in
judging how much should be spent on protection measures
aimed at reducing risks to life.
However, Thomas and Vaughan (2015a) found multiple
failures in tests of the validity of the two-injury chained
method used to interpret results in the Carthy study (Carthy
et al., 1999) on which the UK VPF is based (Department for
Transport, 2014). Chilton, Covey, Jones-Lee, Loomes, Pidgeon
and Spencer attempted to defend their work (Chilton et al.,
2015) but admitted that that their method led to systematic
errors, that it had undoubted limitations, that it needed more
research and that their VPF was reliant on the exercise of
the authors’ own judgement. Thomas and Vaughan (2015b)
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d
dings,replied to this defence, judging that the signiﬁcant reserva-
tions they had expressed concerning the Carthy study and
its methods remained entirely valid. Two of the original six
authors ventured a second defence of the Carthy study (Jones-
Lee and Loomes, 2015) but this was rebutted in full in Thomas
and Vaughan (2015c), where it was concluded that the VPF
derived from the two-injury chained method was unsubstan-
tiated and demonstrably not ﬁt for purpose. A recent review
of the UK VPF by Thomas and Waddington (2017b) provides a
summary of the multiple problems afﬂicting the UK VPF.
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